The benefits to the UK from EU membership have not happened by accident: from big-picture developments to the nuts and bolts of everyday business decisions, UK influence in the EU is an integral element of supporting British business ambitions. The UK has historically influenced right across the legislative process to achieve the outcomes it desires, from the genesis of the Single Market in 1986 to recent British-led progress in Europe on climate change. However, there is a danger that UK influence could wane if the UK does not take steps to maintain it.
The EU policy process is complex and has many actors, with its output having a direct impact on business competitiveness and its ability to create jobs in sectors and regions right across the UK. The nature of the EU means that the UK will not always get its way – being part of a club will inevitably mean compromise occurs – but the UK has a variety of ‘tools of influence’ at its disposal. Not only is it formally one of the most powerful EU members in terms of its voting strength, it is also highly effective at building alliances with other member states. British personnel occupy senior positions in the Commission; British technical expertise informs the detail of policy development from financial services to broadcasting; and the UK uses its membership of international bodies such as the G20 to help shape the international context in which the EU operates.
However, UK business is concerned at recent indications that the UK is not maximising its potential influence on EU outcomes. Domestic action is needed if UK interests are to continue to be best realised through the European Union. The UK must be consistently and proactively engaged - throughout EU institutions and Europe’s member state capitals - if it is to continue to shape the EU to support its global future.
As shown in Chapter 3, specific policies of the EU have helped increase the openness that drives productivity improvements and boosts UK trade globally. The UK has used its influence in Europe to shape the Union to this end to a greater extent than many realise. It drove the establishment of a Single Market to bring down internal protectionist barriers, pushed an external posture that is predicated on a free trade agenda, and spearheaded an enlargement process that widens rather than deepens the EU. The UK has also influenced specific EU policy outcomes that have helped it lead the world in a number of fields, such as financial services and climate change technology. British pragmatism and co-operation with European partners have produced workable solutions at EU level to the big challenges facing all of Europe’s economies.
The UK has used its influence in Europe to shape the Union to a greater extent than many realise.
The need to continue to influence these policy outcomes becomes even more acute when one considers the nature of the modern economy in which many British businesses operate. The challenges business face today – and will continue to face in the future – in a global economy are increasingly insurmountable through purely national solutions (see Exhibit 42). Being influential in the EU and the world would be less of a priority if the UK economy could act in isolation from others. However, as the previous chapters have identified, being successful in a global world is rarely achieved through independent and unilateral action: economies and businesses from across the globe are increasingly interconnected, as goods, services, finance and people – not to mention knowledge and ideas – cross borders ever more rapidly.
Setting the rules of this game, so that everyone gets the chance to compete fairly, increasingly requires co-operation and solutions at European and international level. Given that co-operation often requires negotiation and trade-offs, whether the UK is inside or outside the EU, exerting influence becomes essential to getting a good deal for British business.
The EU policy process spectrum encompasses everything from totemic shifts in the direction of the Union – including the creation of the Single Market or eastwards expansion of the EU – to the day-to-day execution of specific pieces of legislation that can significantly alter the relative competitiveness or even fundamental business models of UK firms.
The impact on business of a specific piece of legislation is the product of a process in which policies are, in stages, initiated, discussed, debated and then adopted. Different actors try to make their voice heard to ultimately ensure the final outcome best realises their interests and objectives.
The nature of the EU policymaking process itself – and the number of actors involved – highlights why influence rather than straight ‘hard power’ is important: the process requires reaching an agreement between 28 member states, over 750 elected Members of the European Parliament, and the European Commission. No single country can get its way without support. Such a consensus-based system means that the various actors work to find the space for a compromise that everyone can approve. Although it is often assumed that it is UK officials conducting these negotiations on behalf of the UK, the EU process allows for significant input from the whole spectrum of British society: UK politicians, private businesses, employer organisations, trade unions and civil society groups can all influence the process both directly and indirectly.
The number of actors shaping legislation in the policy process – and the fact that they increasingly interact with each other during the majority of policy processes – means that the UK has to seek to influence right across the board: in European capitals (to get agreement in the Council and at senior Commission level), in the directly elected European Parliament and in the EU civil service (whether the Commission or various agencies).
Engaging in this policy process is time-consuming, for both business and government, but influencing it is vital to ensuring that the UK continues to benefit from EU membership. High-level political forces clearly dictate many of the EU’s big-picture priorities and over-arching strategies. The UK must undoubtedly influence the EU at this level, and indeed EU Summits and Council meetings are often the focus of headline political messages and reporting. But business is also focused on those day-today decisions that create the conditions in which they have to operate, however unglamorous the nuts and bolts of policymaking may be. Exerting real influence on the policy process – to secure the outcomes that affect businesses on the ground – requires serious and significant effort at both levels.
Negotiations in Brussels go through many rounds in the attempt to refine solutions so that they are as satisfactory as possible to the largest number of actors. It is therefore vital to engage throughout the legislative process to ensure that the ultimate solution fits the UK’s priorities. To begin with, the pre-legislative phase is important for exercising influence, especially in the case of novel policy development where getting in early means that the UK can set the agenda and ensure that the EU focuses on its priorities. For example, the UK has been a key player in driving the recently launched EU trade and investment negotiations with the US and Japan. However, given the extensive alterations that can be made later on in the process – through political horse-trading within and between the institutions – relying solely on the initial stages of the process is not sufficient for a rounded influence strategy.
The UK is one of the most structurally powerful individual member states.
The policy process is a dynamic competition of ideas and interests that can be influenced to further one’s own interests; the winners of the game are the ones that consistently engage over time. The UK will not always get its way, but it has historically been influential enough to ensure that overall successes have outweighed occasional setbacks. Indeed, 72% of British businesses believe that the UK currently has a significant or very significant influence on EU policies that affect their business.
In finding ways to be influential, the UK has a number of ‘tools of influence’ available to it that can be used to bend the EU process to its will. Locating the right tools of influence – formal or informal – and deploying them at the right time towards the appropriate people is the key to a successful influencing strategy. The UK has effectively harnessed the tools of influence available to persuade both partners and opponents to support the UK’s position at key moments in the policymaking process, to the broad benefit of British business in pursuit of their global ambitions.
The UK is one of the most structurally powerful individual member states in a number of EU institutions. But, while the power of this formal influence has always been important and undoubtedly underpins effective UK engagement in Europe, the ability to achieve policy outcomes that best realise Britain’s aims and objectives has often rested on strategic use of informal influence to augment the formal rights that EU membership gives the UK.
While there is no readily available objective measure of any member state’s informal influence in the EU – or indeed any overview of the influence exercised by other actors, such as business representatives or NGOs – analysis of the deployment of the tools of influence available in terms of outcomes gives a useful picture as to how much influence a member state has.
Building alliances is the key to maximising the formal influence available to the UK through voting. This is furthered by the extent to which the UK can place supportive personnel in key EU institutions, use its credibility in areas of national expertise and bring pressure from international actors to bear in order to shape legislation that best realises UK interests and objectives (see Exhibit 43).
The UK is a large member state and has correspondingly large structural power. The UK is today among the major powers within the Council with the same largest share of weighted votes (29 or 8%) as Germany, France and Italy. In the European Parliament the UK has 73 of 766 seats, around 10% of the total, which is the third-largest share after Germany and France. This formal influence leaves the UK well placed to use its voting power to further its aims.
In the Council of the European Union each member state’s vote is currently weighted according to population size, with the UK having the third-highest population among EU member states. Certain decisions still require unanimity to pass, namely in the areas of taxation, social security or social protection, the accession of new states to the European Union, foreign and common defence policy and operational police cooperation between the member states. Unanimity offers some protection to the UK, but can also limit the UK’s ability to achieve the change it wants if other member states oppose it, as they hold the same power of veto as the UK.
UK MEPs represent nearly a tenth of the European Parliament
The majority of today’s policy decisions, are therefore now made under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), where no country’s vote alone is enough to win or block a decision, to allow the EU to remain responsive to challenges while respecting the broad consensus of member state thought.
In the European Parliament, the formal voting power of MEPs takes a number of forms. At the most basic level, all UK MEPs have an individual vote on EU legislation. MEPs are also members of various political groupings in the Parliament, made up of collections of different parties from across Europe, and they can vote to decide their group’s position in advance of policy being decided. Influencing the larger groups from within can be crucial to influencing the wider Parliament.
In the Commission, formal voting is less important. That said, during the initial drafting of legislation to propose, all Commissioners have to agree on a proposal before it progresses to the full legislative process. It is important that the UK’s Commissioner exercises this right to vote, or works to shape a consensus so that a formal vote is not needed.
However, the formal influence garnered through voting rights is by no means the ultimate barometer of overall influence for an EU member state, for two main reasons. First, the potential of voting to influence outcomes has changed over time through formal changes to the Council voting process, including the shift from unanimity to an increasing number of decisions being taken under QMV and, from November 2014, a new voting system which aims to increase the ease of decision-making in Council. Furthermore, the rise in power of the European Parliament through its increasing role in the policymaking process has reduced the ability of member state governments to simply rely on their formal voting power in Council to realise their aims.
Secondly, because consensus is preferred to putting policies to a straight vote, the nature of the EU policy process means that using formal influence tools alone is rarely the best way to further UK interests. Informal influence is therefore increasingly important.
The UK is effective at building alliances when it engages positively and consistently. The UK’s large voting weight allows it to act as an attractive anchor for alliances, facilitating coalitions with a large member state at the base.
Britain has historically been closely aligned with other northern European countries – who often share similar economic stances – in particular Finland, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the Baltic states. Far from the ’awkward partner‘ often portrayed and despite not taking part in a number of areas of further integration such as the single currency or Schengen Area, the UK has historically built alliances across the EU to corral support for its position in areas right across the policy spectrum.
It has been argued that, by choosing to remain outside the Eurozone, the UK may struggle to build alliances within the Council. However, in reality, the ‘opt-out’ countries appear to perform on a par with the ‘in’ countries when it comes to forming alliances. It is important to be seen as credible and co-operative – each participant has to be willing to find common ground and acceptable solutions to concrete problems, often in the face of overarching ideological disagreement – and the most powerful states, such as Germany and France, broadly see the UK as such a partner.
Far from the ‘awkward partner’ often portrayed and despite not taking part in a number of areas of further integration such as the single currency or Schengen Area, the UK has historically built alliances across the EU to corral support for its position.
A survey of more than 600 member state representatives found that the UK, although outside the Eurozone, is a powerful member state with high ‘network capital’, indicating that other member states are keen to engage and co-operate with Britain. In the three years when the survey was conducted, the UK had the highest network capital of all countries in the EU in 2009 and 2003, and it came second in 2006. Moreover, the UK is the preferred partner of the most powerful member states and often functions as a key intermediary between countries.
The UK has best realised its interests when it has built strong coalitions in Council to robustly defend its interests during negotiations. For example, in response to suggested amendments to the 1992 Directive on pregnant workers, the UK was able to block damaging proposals during the negotiation phase by building an alliance with Germany and other member states who also believed the proposals overstepped the boundaries of subsidiarity and would increase costs for both companies and governments without solid evidence.
Again, on trade policy, the UK has recently been effective in building coalitions with Germany, the Nordics and the Netherlands in cases when the European Commission has sought to introduce proposals that restrict the EU’s market openness, including on public procurement and mandatory origin marking.
These alliances are most influential in the build-up to a vote that will form a position, whether internal or final, rather than at the technical specification phase when political disagreements are likely to have already been overcome. However, effective coalitions at even earlier stages, especially in more than one institution, can sometimes prevent an issue becoming a concern even before a full proposal emerges, as was the case in the Commission’s review of rules for pension funds (IORP), where a broad alliance put a halt to a capital requirements regime unfit for the pension industry (see Exhibit 44).
Building alliances helps the UK not only when it is looking to defend its interests but also if it wants to set the big-picture agenda items that the Commission and Council focus on in the longer term – whether to prioritise a free trade agenda or to cut red tape. Setting the agenda is most likely when the UK has built a coalition of like-minded states before the legislative phase even begins. For example, the ’Green Growth‘ group – driven in large part by UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change Ed Davey – brings together 14 ministers from across the EU to discuss positions among like-minded countries and to build the public and political momentum necessary to influence EU energy and climate change policies and legislation to the advantage of those states and the EU as a whole. This government-to-government engagement can be replicated between national parliaments, to build coalitions of parliamentarians that can push messages in their respective member states to pressure their governments to take these messages to Brussels and into negotiations.
These coalitions – whether to set the agenda or see off potential threats to UK interests – are stronger when they are built on broad-based alliances across all the EU institutions, starting from a position of relative UK unity.
Creating a common position among domestic actors is vital to presenting a united UK position in Europe that can be the foundation of strong pan-EU coalitions. Having the UK government, UK MEPs, UK staff in the Commission (including the UK Commissioner) and UK external actors such as business groups united behind a broadly common position greatly increases the chance of then mapping this position on to the European policy process. Using business federations or technical bodies can help member states strengthen arguments that persuades other member states to enter alliances. For example, the CBI’s report with Oxford Economics on the impact of strict prudential rules on pension funds helped give rigorous underpinning to arguments against an overly strict regime that resulted in a successful outcome on the legislation (see Exhibit 44).
Furthermore, powers granted in the Lisbon Treaty to national Parliaments also increase the importance of involving domestically elected representatives in this process, so they can then use their connections to build links with parliamentarians in other member states as well as their own UK party’s MEPs (see Exhibit 45).
Once a common UK position has been adopted, it is important to build coalitions right across the EU institutions throughout all stages of the policy process. As described above, the UK has historically been successful at building alliances in the Council, but it needs to replicate this in the other institutions. The UK needs to work to build support for its reactive positions in the Commission – at staff level and at Commissioner level – but also for those issues where it wants the UK Commissioner to push issues proactively.
Building alliances in the European Parliament between MEPs of different member states must also be a focus, and engaging at a political level to build alliances at political party and grouping level is also an important influence channel. Unfortunately, the UK’s historical success in building alliances in the Council has struggled to spill over into the Parliament. The party political nature of the institution – as well as the current lack of UK representation in the biggest political grouping, the European People’s Party – has reduced UK influence here. The UK’s first ever defeat on a piece of substantive financial services legislation is an example of this need to increase influence across institutions and throughout the policy process: proposals regarding remuneration in the banking sector hijacked a wider vote on the Capital Requirements Directive IV, seeing the UK outvoted for the first time on financial services legislation after it had failed to build and maintain alliances on the issue throughout the legislative process in both the Council and the Parliament.
Historically, proactive and positive engagement to craft consensus has led to successful outcomes. The lack of prior diplomatic engagement which led to the December 2011 ‘veto’ was not only ineffective in that the veto did not particularly influence the final outcome (the bulk of policy behind the proposed Treaty for Stability and Growth went ahead), but it also harmed British influence in day-to-day negotiations in Brussels, particularly on financial services. In contrast, the UK’s positive coalition building led to a considerable ‘win’ for the UK during EU budget negotiations 12 months later. The UK government is clearly most influential when it is most engaged, and business supports a continuation of this positive engagement.
Having national citizens in prominent positions, both political and official, in EU institutions is an important tool of informal influence.
Such personnel give a number of advantages. First, information that helps member states stay up to date with policy developments that might impact on national interests often flows from personnel posted to EU institutions. As former UK diplomat Sir Colin Budd told the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee: “all EU member states rely significantly on the nationals they have in the EU institutions as part of their collective networking strength”. Secondly, it gives the UK a platform to set the agenda of the EU’s institutions. This is true in the Commission, where the Commissioner (and his Cabinet and Director-General) can help set the agenda, but it is also increasingly true in the Parliament, as senior Parliamentarians in political groupings and as Chairs of key Committees are more often taking a lead on policy promotion.
A third benefit of having personnel in the EU institutions is the influence it affords a member state over the details of legislation. This is useful both during negotiation stages – for example, by having Rapporteurs in the Parliament or desk officers and senior officials in the Council/Commission – and when technical details are being finalised in technical committees or agencies. Having influential people in the Commission who closely understand the UK’s point of view – either by their nationality or by having heard persuasive representations from UK actors – is crucial, especially during the drafting of legislation.
Politically, the potential for UK influence via the Parliament is considerable, especially when one considers the power that rapporteurs or shadow-rapporteurs have to influence the final text of legislation. For example, in the case of data protection, UK MEPs Timothy Kirkhope (Conservative) and Baroness Ludford (Liberal Democrat) used their positions as shadow rapporteurs in the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee to champion amendments alleviating the burdens on firms against the more stringent approach taken by the main rapporteur on the data protection Directive.
There are also challenges in the European Parliament: the UK needs to look to improve the attendance and voting record of its MEP representation, as some MEPs are currently failing to exercise those formal rights they have been given to further British interests (see Exhibit 47). British business is dependent on MEPs who work for the UK in the increasingly powerful Parliament because their activity has a direct impact on the day-to-day operations of companies by deciding issues like product rules, capital requirements or labour market reform.
The UK has had a relatively strong presence in the staff of the European Commission for many years, with UK nationals holding strategically valuable positions at a senior level (see Exhibit 48). This strong representation over the past 20 years has allowed the UK to hold the joint highest number of the most senior EU civil service positions in the Commission, with five Directors-General currently in post (see Exhibit 48). However, in terms of the Commissioners themselves, the present division of Commission portfolios among member states does not favour the UK in terms of business priorities.
Historically, the UK has been relatively effective in using its representation in the staff of EU institutions, most notably in the Commission. But the UK is in danger of a significant reduction in its ability to use this channel of influence. In relation to its share of the EU’s population, the UK is now significantly under-represented in terms of staffing levels in the Commission and Parliament. The lack of UK staff in the Parliament is especially concerning given the increase in its formal powers and political influence in recent years.
The number of UK nationals in the Commission staff has fallen by a quarter in seven years, standing at a total of 4.6% of Commission staff, compared to the UK’s 12.5% share of the EU’s population. In comparison, French nationals make up 9.7%. UK presence has also fallen in the last three years in the secretariat of the Council and the European Parliament. The UK has higher shares of senior positions than junior ones (a worrying ‘generation gap’) but comes behind France in all categories. For instance, among junior positions in the Parliament staff the UK had just a 2.1% share at the start of 2013 compared to France’s 17.4%, and at entry-level administrator grade in the Commission there were 14 member states with more nationals than the UK.
Fixing the ‘generation gap’ that has opened up among UK staff in EU institutions is essential to maintaining UK influence.
Given the importance of staff to framing the parameters of legislation, fixing this ’generation gap’ that has opened up at levels where early decisions are made about the direction of legislation, and reversing the overall downward trend in UK representation, is essential. The UK government’s EU Staffing Unit in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), established in April 2013, should be a helpful tool, working to place additional seconded national experts in the short term and increase the number of permanent officials in the longer term by promoting recruitment opportunities to students, graduates and professionals. But Foreign Secretary William Hague could not have put it better when he said that present staff numbers indicated a failure to “give due weight to the development of British influence in the EU”, and the UK needs to address this deficiency.
The number of UK nationals in the Commission staff has fallen by a quarter since 2006
Although the direction of the policy agenda is dictated primarily by political forces, the EU undoubtedly looks to those member states with expertise when deciding policy direction, as well as specifics, in particular areas. This allows member states with key interests, and often therefore the corresponding expertise, to better protect and further those interests. This is especially true during the policy formulation stage, when establishing a fact-base for a proposal necessitates engaging with experts and those with real-world experience of the issue, but also during ongoing negotiations, when technical dexterity can often find a way around political roadblocks.
The UK has historically used its expertise and the credibility of its citizens, both as policymakers within institutions and as external contributors to the policy process, as an important tool to influence the direction of policy in the EU.
The UK has historically used its expertise and the credibility of its citizens, both as policymakers within institutions and as external contributors to the policy process, as an important tool to influence the direction of policy in the EU. For example, the UK’s expertise in the area of financial services – based on London’s position as a global financial centre and the Bank of England’s historic reputation as a regulator as well as central bank – has given it significant influence on the direction and development of financial services legislation, from the liberalisation of financial services under the Irish Commissioner Charlie McCreevy at the end of the last decade to forming the EU’s response to the recent financial crisis (see Exhibit 49).
Once legislation reaches the technical specification phase, having expertise becomes crucial: details are technical and it is difficult for political actors to follow the process, so having expertise becomes the primary way to exert influence on the details that can impact directly on business models. This is particularly true in areas with increasing use of detailed legislation at EU level (see Exhibit 50). For example, the use of delegated and implementing acts in Commission drafts for both the Network and Information Security Directive (cyber security) and the General Data Protection Regulation have sparked fears among industry that inappropriate calibration of final rules could hinder innovation. Having UK expertise informing the development of these rules is therefore an important influence tool to get the right result for business.
Outside groups and individuals, including from the UK, can also influence the policy process through credible intervention and by showing examples of best practice. The EU’s policymaking and deliberative organisations are in constant demand for information as resources are relatively scarce. EU officials therefore regularly call on a number of external actors during the European public policy process, including national regulators and the business community, and the UK’s credibility on a number of issues has historically allowed it to increase its influence on the policy process (see Exhibit 51).
Although the UK is seeing its standing increasing in a number of areas, most notably on climate change issues and in the area of telecoms, one of the biggest threats to UK influence in the EU in this area comes from the reputational hit the UK took as a result of the financial crisis. Some in Europe have pointed to the failure of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model (as critics term it) as an indication that the UK can no longer be trusted on financial services regulation. Regaining credibility in this area should be a key aim of the UK government and financial services industry, as historic gains in this area have, in part, been built on the European model for deferring authority to those who have credibility and expertise in a particular area.
The final ‘tool of influence’ for the UK is the use of international forums that can shape the strategic direction of policy debates. Global institutions can help set the parameters of legislation at a European level in line with UK objectives, especially as the agenda is increasingly being set at an international level to deliver responses to global challenges (see Exhibit 52).
More than half the 47 pieces of EU financeial services legislation put forward since 2009 directly reer to the EU's G20 commitments
The EU operates in a global environment and the priorities of third countries and international institutions have an impact on the EU policy process. As an international actor itself, the EU is informally influenced by discussions that occur at international level on global issues, such as on global warming and tax transparency, as well as taking part in formal international institutions such as the WTO that dictate the parameters within which certain policies must operate.
In a globalised world, there is also an increasing impact on the EU’s day-to-day policy process from international decisions, with a significant amount of EU regulation now stemming from international agreements to which the EU and its member states are signatories. The international response to the global financial crisis, and its subsequent impact on EU and UK legislation, highlights this trend. Following the financial crisis, the EU has driven forward comprehensive reform of the financial services regulatory framework. A substantial part of these reforms are the translation of the commitments the EU has made in the G20, as stated in the Commission’s description of the financial services reform: “The G20 has been instrumental in establishing the core elements of a new global financial regulatory framework that will make the financial system more resilient”. More than half of the 47 pieces of legislation put forward in total since 2009 directly refer to the EU’s G20 commitments.
This international policy agenda is mirrored to some extent in trade policy: many EU rules are ratifications of WTO agreements developed by WTO members, such as rules on public procurement, while the recently agreed international Nagoya Protocol on biodiversity will decide EU’s rules in this area. The UK can therefore use its influence in the various international bodies – both political and technical –to ensure that the rules which filter down to the EU from international institutions, and therefore which will eventually reach the UK via the EU, are set in line with UK interests.
The UK is influential in these international bodies partly by virtue of being a large economy in its own right but also because it is seen as influential in the wider EU. In a bi-causal relationship, the UK can influence international bodies – which in turn can influence the EU to UK advantage – precisely because the other actors in those bodies believe that the UK can influence the direction of the 500 million-strong EU bloc in the first instance. Therefore there is a danger that the UK’s ability to persuade international actors to bring pressure to bear on the EU could be diminished if the international community perceives the UK to be abrogating its leadership role in Europe.
The UK has been influential in shaping the EU to maximise the aspects of openness that underpin the UK’s global trading role. It has considerable voting power, is effective at building alliances, has key personnel in EU institutions, and is an acknowledged thought leader in a number of areas. It also uses its membership of international bodies such as the G20 to further influence the EU in a top-down approach.
The UK has large voting power, is effective at building alliances, has key personnel in EU institutions, and is an acknowledged thought leader in a number of areas. It now needs to work to maximise this influence.
There are, however, signs that the UK is not maximising its potential to influence EU outcomes. The UK government must continue to proactively build alliances to achieve its aims across the EU institutions and in other member states. The fallout from the use of the veto in December 2011 has meant that the UK must redouble its efforts to proactively win support. Similarly, the UK must work to reverse the decline in numbers of UK staff employed in the Commission and Parliament, and attempt to rebuild its reputation as a source of expertise on financial services issues.
UK influence will matter more than ever in the coming period, as the further integration of the Eurozone potentially changes the nature of the EU. The UK must navigate a course that ensures it shapes the EU to preserve the advantages of membership felt by British business. The likely scenario for the development of the EU and the Eurozone are explored in Chapter 5.
 Mark Carney, ‘A plan to finish fixing the global financial system’, Financial Times, 09 September 2013.
 European Commission, ‘Commissioner Barnier welcomes historic agreement on the European unitary patent package’, available at
 15,000 officials and European parliamentary officials face 20,000 lobbyists on a daily basis. Greenwood 2002a; European Commission 2001).
 CBI/YouGov, Survey of CBI members’ opinion on the impact of the EU on their competitiveness, July 2013, available at
 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, ‘The future of the European Union: UK Government policy’, 2012
 The total number of MEPs has been temporarily boosted following the accession of Croatia. Following the 2014 elections, the UK will have 73 of a total 751 seats.
 Naurin & Lindahl ‘Out in the cold’, 2010
 Oxford Economics, The economic impact for the EU of a Solvency II inspired funding regime for pension funds, 2012
 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The future of the European Union: UK Government policy, May 2013
 VoteWatch. Voting records 2009 – October 2013. Date does not take into account that a number of MEPs have arrived in the interim and consequently have shorter voting records for analysis.
 Against its 12.5% share of the EU population, the UK now fields 4.6% of Commission staff, 5.8% administrator-grade staff in the European Parliament and 4.3% of administrator-grade staff in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The UK staff presence in the EU institutions, 2013.
 Oliver Fritsch, Claudio M. Radaelli, Lorna Schrefler & Andrea Renda, ‘Regulatory Quality in the European Commission and the UK: Old questions and new findings’, 2012